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Abstract. This paper briefly describes the approach taken to the subtask of Text 
Alignment in the Plagiarism Detection track at PAN 14. We have now re-
implemented our PAN12 approach in a consistent programmatic manner, 
courtesy of secured research funding. PAN 14 offers us the first opportunity to 
evaluate the performance/consistency of this re-implementation. We present 
results from this re-implementation with respect to various PAN collections. 
1   Introduction 
As reported in our PAN 13 notebook paper, having secured funding from the UK 
government-backed Technology Strategy Board for 18 months, the University of 
Surrey have been working on the Intellectual Property Protecting Cloud Services in 
Supply Chains (IPCRESS) project, a collaboration with Jaguar Land Rover and 
GeoLang Ltd. The IPCRESS project is focused on the difficulty of entrusting valuable 
Intellectual Property (IP) to third parties, through the Cloud, as is necessary to allow 
for the construction of components in the supply chain. The key innovation is the 
ability to track high-value IP without having to reveal that IP – so approaches need to 
avoid being reversible to text in clear. Such tracking is then suited to the tasks of (i) 
preventing IP leakage; (ii) detecting IP leakage or theft; and (iii) identifying retention 
beyond allowed review periods. The project builds from the proposed formulation of 
such a system in Cooke and Gillam 2011.  
In this paper, we briefly discuss the simplification of the code-base from our 
original submissions to the present and much more self-contained setup, and 
demonstrate the consistency of results obtained. We also hint at improvements in our 
treatment of obfuscation that are likely to become a focal point for future work also. 
Section 2 provides a brief summary of results found with re-used software applied 
to PAN 2011, PAN 2012 and PAN 2013 datasets. Section 3 carries discussion of the 
IPCRESS re-implementation. Section 4 presents results of applying IPCRESS to the 
datsets for PAN 2012 and PAN 2013, and preliminary results found using initial 
obfuscation handling approaches. Section 5 comments on the PAN 2014 results and 
future work.  
2   Previous PAN results 
We have discussed in previous PAN efforts (e.g. Cooke, 2011) how our intention is 
to be able to find matching text without revealing the textual content. In PAN 11, the 
approach brought us 4th place, with PlagDet=0.2467329, Recall=0.1500480, 
Precision=0.7106536, Granularity=1.0058894. In 2012, we showed good granularity, 
with high recall and precision for non-obfuscated text, but not such great recall in the 
face of obfuscation (see Table below).  
 
Test Plagdet 
Score 
Recall Precision Granularity 
02_no_obfuscation 0.92530 0.90449 0.94709 1.0 
03_artificial_low 0.09837 0.05374 0.93852 1.04688 
04_artificial_high 0.01508 0.00867 0.96822 1.20313 
06_simulated_paraphrase 0.11229 0.05956 0.97960 1.0 
 
In 2013, precision and granularity figures remained high, though recall had 
dropped. For different kinds of obfuscation from 2012, recall remains low – though 
perhaps surprisingly is better for random obfuscation than for translation or summary.  
 
Test Plagdet 
Score 
Recall Precision Granularity 
02_no_obfuscation 0.85884 0.83788 0.88088 1.0 
03_random_obfuscation 0.04191 0.02142 0.95968 1.0 
04_translation_obfuscation 0.01224 0.00616 0.97273 1.0 
05_summary_obfuscation 0.00218 0.00109 0.99591 1.0 
3   The IPCRESS implementation 
For the IPCRESS project, the previous codebase needed to be homogenized and 
developed in such a manner as to be scalable to very large datasets. The previous 
version/s were memory-based and thus not suitable for use at real scale (hundreds of 
gigabytes or more). The IPCRESS code has been fully re-designed as a disk-based 
approach, as an object oriented implemention in C++. A new stitching algorithm has 
also been developed. 
The IPCRESS approach generates what we refer to as secure stamps from whole 
documents. From stamp generation, we derive hash-like codes from sets of words. 
These codes are considered irreversible. The codes are generated using a sliding 
window of length, Wlen, over the stamp, and the index is populated with codes 
associated to document ID’s and code positions. 
A query is similarly generated using the sliding window of length, Wlen, over a 
suspicious document to generate a set of queries, Qqi ∈ . The document ID and code 
position pairs are retrieved from the index for each Qqi ∈ , and sorted by document 
ID to give a set of results D. Each element, Dd i ∈ , relates to a source document and 
is itself a set of results,  idT . This set is composed of information related to text 
segments, idj Tt ∈ , each of length Wlen; each element, tj, is a pair composed of 
{suspicious position, source position}. 
 Each set, idT , is then reduced via a first stage stitching algorithm to produce a set 
of runs, idR , where each run, idk Rr ∈ , relates to a subset, ik
dr TT ⊂ , and each 
element of krT  is either consecutive to or overlapping the previous element. Any 
runs, rk, that are less than a defined minimum run length (MRL) are discarded. Each 
element, rk, is a 4-tuple consisting of {suspicious start position, suspicious length, 
source start position, and source length}. 
A second stage stitching algorithm produces a set of text segments, idS ,  from the 
set of runs idR . The algorithm finds subsets, idRR ⊂ , such that each element of R 
are all within a defined stitch distance (SD) of at least one other element of R in terms 
of both suspicious and source position. The size of each subset is maximized so that 
idS  is of minimal length. From each subset, R, a new 4-tuple is formed, idm Ss ∈ , 
that gives {suspicious start position, suspicious length, source start position source 
length}; the start positions are given by the first element of R and the lengths are 
determined from the last element of R. Any segments found that are shorter than a 
defined minimum segment length (MSL) are discarded. 
 
4. 1 Obfuscation Handling 
 
We consider two initial obfuscation handling approaches based on transformations 
of a single query into closely related queries. The hash-like codes mentioned above 
are formulated such that code similarity can be indicative of data similarity, and as 
such the ‘closeness’ of any two queries can be based on binary distance approaches 
such as Hamming and Levenshtein. 
The first approach, based on Hamming distances, generates transformed queries 
with a given maximum Hamming distance with relation to the original enquiry. For 
an original query Qqi ∈ , of length Wlen, this approach will generate an extra Wlen 
transformations. For a Hamming distance of 1, say, this method involves an extra Wlen 
look-ups for each initial query. 
The second approach, based on the Levenshtein distance, similarly generates 
transformed queries from each original query,  qi.  For a query length of Wlen, this 
approach generates 2 sets of transformations Ti0 and Ti1 where i refers to a word 
position within query, qi, and lies in the range lenWi <≤0 . This approach requires 
2*Wlen extra look-ups for each query. For each insertion the transformed query, Tin, is 
masked to length Wlen  for index compatibility. 
4   IPCRESS vs previous PAN collections 
Prior results offer up a standard to be achieved in re-implementation. The new 
codebase has been tested against data from PAN12 and PAN13, with modifications to 
the algorithm largely demonstrating slightly improved performance, as shown in the 
tables below: 
 
IPCRESS raw – PAN12 data 
Test Plagdet Score Recall Precision Granularity 
02_no_obfuscation 0.9437 0.9045 0.9877 1.0008 
03_artificial_low 0.0956 0.0525 0.9942 1.0608 
04_artificial_high 0.0200 0.0118 0.9852 1.2459 
06_simulated_paraphrase 0.0992 0.0522 0.9922 1.0000 
Obfuscation handler #1 (Hamming) 
02_no_obfuscation 0.9358 0.9048 0.9703 1.0008 
03_artificial_low 0.1970 0.1110 0.9853 1.0178 
04_artificial_high 0.0373 0.0201 0.9577 1.0759 
06_simulated_paraphrase 0.1512 0.0825 0.9038 1.0000 
Obfuscation handler #2 (Levenshtein) 
02_no_obfuscation 0.9236 0.9057 0.9423 1.0000 
03_artificial_low 0.1888 0.1066 0.9820 1.0266 
04_artificial_high 0.0682 0.0368 0.9489 1.0535 
06_simulated_paraphrase 0.1345 0.0723 0.9572 1.0000 
 
IPCRESS raw – PAN13 data 
Test Plagdet Score Recall Precision Granularity 
02_no_obfuscation 0.9253 0.9273 0.9233 1.0000 
03_random_obfuscation 0.1356 0.0729 0.9675 1.0000 
04_translation_obfuscation 0.0243 0.0123 0.9865 1.0000 
05_summary_obfuscation 0.0022 0.0011 0.9959 1.0000 
Obfuscation handler #1 (Hamming) 
02_no_obfuscation 0.9029 0.9289 0.8783 1.0000 
03_random_obfuscation 0.1297 0.1297 0.9120 1.0000 
04_translation_obfuscation 0.0244 0.0244 0.8953 1.0000 
05_summary_obfuscation 0.0035 0.0017 0.9807 1.0000 
Obfuscation handler #2 (Levenshtein) 
02_no_obfuscation 0.9058 0.9274 0.8853 1.0000 
03_random_obfuscation 0.2151 0.1224 0.8936 1.0000 
04_translation_obfuscation 0.0743 0.0386 0.9533 1.0000 
05_summary_obfuscation 0.0035 0.0017 0.9920 1.0000 
 
5   IPCRESS vs PAN 2014 and Future Work 
PAN 2014 test results showed expected granularity and precision, but a surprising 
difference between values for recall. Investigations led to the discovery of a bug in 
detecting UTF-8 codes; when applied to PAN 2012 and 2013 collections, a similar 
lowering of values was also observed. 
 
Test data Plagdet  Precision  Recall  Granularity  Runtime 
Corpus 2 0.28302  0.88630  0.16840  1.00000  00:00:55 
Corpus 3 0.44076 0.85744 0.29661 1.00000 00:00:56 
 
We have demonstrated that the IPCRESS code produces results comparable to, and 
even slightly better than, the previous implementation, and effort has been put into 
ensuring the implementation is suited to scaling to very large datasets. Initial attempts 
at handling obfuscation show some promise, but much more rigorous evaluation will 
be required to determine the fullest extent of impact achievable by these approaches 
on the hash-like codes.  
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